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Digital Health and Regulatory
Experimentation at the FDA
Nathan Cortez*
ABSTRACT
For well over a decade the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
been told that its framework for regulating traditional medical devices is not
modern or flexible enough to address increasingly novel digital health
technologies. Very recently, however, the FDA introduced a series of digital
health initiatives that represent important experiments in medical product
regulation, departing from longstanding precedents applied to therapeutic
products like drugs and devices. The FDA will experiment with shifting its
scrutiny from the pre-market to the post-market phase, shifting the locus of
regulation from products to firms, and shifting from centralized government
review to decentralized non-government review. This Article evaluates these new
regulatory approaches, explains how they depart from previous approaches, and
discusses why these experiments themselves require evaluation moving forward.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) first
encountered medical software, the agency has largely regulated software devices
like more traditional, tangible medical devices. In the words of one expert back
in 1986, FDA staff tended to treat medical software like “some kind of new
bedpan.”1 But the FDA itself¾and everyone else¾has long suspected that
software is different. For example, FDA staff in the 1980s were aware that
software differed from traditional devices in terms of design, quality assurance,
and user errors. The same observer above acknowledged that FDA staff, “people
of immense goodwill,” were “wrestling” with these differences.2
Finally, perhaps spurred by the ongoing revolution in digital health
technologies, the FDA has started to experiment with a novel regulatory
framework better tailored to software that qualify as medical “devices” subject to
FDA jurisdiction. Referred to collectively as “digital health,” the products
include mobile applications, clinical decision support (CDS) software, artificial
intelligence (AI), and machine learning programs that perform some medical
device function. The agency calls its plans an “entirely new” and “comprehensive
approach to the regulation of digital health tools.”3
This Article identifies and evaluates three important experiments with
medical product regulation in the FDA’s new framework. First, the FDA
proposes to shift its scrutiny from the pre-market phase to the post-market phase,
with the idea of bringing technologies to market more quickly but giving
increased scrutiny to “real world” data generated once a product is on the market.
Second, the FDA proposes to shift the locus of regulation from products to firms,
focusing its review on whether the firms that produce digital health devices
engage in sufficient quality control, rather than its traditional product-centered
approach. Third, the FDA also proposes to outsource some of these review
functions to third-party certifiers, shifting from centralized government review to
decentralized non-government review. This Article will evaluate these new
regulatory approaches, explaining how they depart from previous approaches and
why these innovations might be important.
A swirl of activity has brought us to this point¾acts of Congress, guidance
documents, public workshops, and inter-agency working groups and reports,
1. Information Technologies in the Health Care System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong. (1986)
(statement of Vincent Brannigan).
2. Id.
3. Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Fostering Medical Innovation: A Plan
for Digital Health Devices (Jun. 15, 2017), available at https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/FDAVoices/ucm612019.htm.
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culminating in the FDA’s 2017 Digital Health Innovation Action Plan. After
years of pushing Congress and the agency to think creatively about digital health,
we can now evaluate these experiments in light of the unique challenges of
digital health oversight.
I. EVERYTHING’S OLD!
A. FDA’s Traditional Approach to Software Regulation
For roughly 40 years, the FDA has regulated computerized medical devices
under a framework established by the 1976 Medical Device Amendments.4
Despite Congress’s longstanding interest in computerized medicine,5 it went
decades without passing legislation to clarify the FDA’s role in reviewing
dramatic new advances in medical computing.6 Thus, during a profound
computer revolution, the FDA has been both blessed and cursed with significant
discretion in how to adapt the 1976 statutory framework to computer hardware
and software products. Eventually, of course, the health industry introduced new
technologies that few could have imagined in 1976.7 Of course, all statutes age
with time. But rapid technological advances in both computing and the
biosciences only accelerated the aging process of the 1976 Medical Device
Amendments.
Despite being given wide latitude, the FDA’s interest in regulating software
has been reluctant, until very recently. Indeed, the agency’s posture toward
software has been halting and sporadic.8 It began in the 1970s, when the FDA
approved applications for a certain computerized products, such as cardiac
pacemaker programmers, patient monitors, and magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) machines.9 In the 1980s, FDA contemplated crafting more comprehensive
rules, creating a Task Force on Computers and Software as Medical Devices in
1981, and a Program Management Committee on Software and Computerized
4. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, 94th Cong. (1976), codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301 et seq.
5. See, e.g., Computers in Health Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and
International Scientific Planning, Analysis, and Cooperation of the H. Comm. on Science and
Technology, 95th Cong. (1978); Health Information Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Science, Research, and Technology and Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research,
and Environment of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong. (1981); see also Nathan
Cortez, Analogy Agency in a Digital World, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE
CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 438, 442-43 (2015).
6. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 442-43.
7. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173
(2014).
8. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 443-47.
9. Information Technologies in the Health Care System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong. (1986).
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Devices in 1984.10 The decade culminated with FDA publishing a Draft Policy
for the Regulation of Computer Products in 1987 and then an update in 1989.11
In the 1990s, the FDA again hinted that it was considering comprehensive
rules tailored to software devices, but never proposed them.12 In 2005, the FDA
unceremoniously withdrew its 1989 Draft Policy without comment.13 In 2011,
the agency explained that it had never published an “overarching software
policy” because “the use of computer and software products grew exponentially
and the types of products diversified and grew more complex.”14 Thus, as the
technology raced forward, the FDA moved very little¾insisting that the 1976
device framework could be adapted to software devices.
This tailoring happened through the FDA’s relatively narrow, piecemeal
rulemaking, product reviews, and publication of guidance. Together, these
discrete acts gradually articulated the FDA’s expectations for software devices.
For example, Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations includes dozens of
sections that reference software, though the vast majority refer to specific device
classifications;15 few establish broad rules for software devices.16 Software is
given specific attention in the Quality Systems Regulation (QSR) and in rules for
radiology products.17 Otherwise, FDA regulations establish almost no broadly
applicable, binding rules for software devices distinct from non-software
devices.18
Without decisive rules, most of the FDA’s action on software has been in
individual product reviews and guidance. For example, the agency has cleared
numerous software devices through its 510(k) notification process, which
declares that a product is “substantially equivalent” to a predicate device already
on the market.19 The agency has cleared hundreds of digital health products, but
has been criticized for declaring that novel digital and mobile technologies are
substantially equivalent to older devices that were introduced well before
smartphones even existed.20 The FDA can also clear products that are not
10. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 444.
11. 52 Fed. Reg. 36104 (Sep. 25, 1987); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT POLICY FOR THE
REGULATION OF COMPUTER PRODUCTS (Nov. 13, 1989), available at 1989 WL 1178702.
12. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 443-44.
13. 70 Fed. Reg. 824, 890 (Jan. 5, 2005).
14. U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and
Drug Administration Staff; Mobile Medical Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43689 (Jul. 21, 2011).
15. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. parts 862-92.
16. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 445.
17. See, 21 C.F.R. parts 1000-1050, 820.
18. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 445.
19. FDCA § 510(k); 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).
20. See, e.g., Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, 371 NEW. ENG. J.
MED. 372, 375 (2014).
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substantially equivalent to a predicate through a de novo classification under
section 513 of the Act.21 For example, in September 2018 the FDA granted
Apple’s request for de novo classification of an electrocardiogram (ECG)
software application on the Apple Watch that can detect atrial fibrillation and
other arrhythmias.22
The most striking feature of the FDA’s traditional approach to software is its
heavy reliance on nonbinding guidance. For example, the agency addresses
premarket submissions, software design controls, cyber security, and a host of
other topics on software devices through twenty-six guidance documents.23 These
guidances are supplemented by dozens more that assign “special controls” to
Class II, so-called “moderate risk” devices (Class I are “low risk” while Class III
are “high risk”).24 Moreover, the FDA’s own guidances are built on a scaffolding
of even more nonbinding guidances published by standard-setting groups like the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).25
Thus, the story of the FDA’s traditional approach to software is one of the
agency clarifying how a regulatory framework established in 1976 applies to
devices of ever-increasing novelty, complexity, and sophistication.
B. Updating for Digital Health
The FDA began articulating regulatory expectations for digital health
products in 2011, when it published a Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical
Applications.26 That same year, FDA down-classified a related but relatively
mundane category of software, known as “medical device data systems,” from
Class III to Class I.27 (Typically, high-risk Class III devices require pre-market
21. FDCA § 513; 21 U.S.C. § 360c.
22. Letter to Donna-Bea Tillman and Apple, Inc. from Angela C. Krueger, Center for
Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), U.S. Food and Drug Admin. (FDA) of Sep. 11, 2018,
available at https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf18/DEN180044.pdf.
23. Cortez, Analog Agency, supra note 5, at 446-47 (finding 26 separate guidance
documents¾including 15 original and 11 updated versions¾published by FDA on software
devices as of 2015). In 2018, undoubtedly, there are many more, although this author has not
updated this accounting. However, the FDA does helpfully include a link to all “Guidances with
digital health content.” FDA, Guidances with Digital Health Content (Mar. 8, 2018), at
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/ucm562577.htm.
24. Id. at 447.
25. Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 7, at 1223.
26. U.S. Food and Drug Admin. (FDA), Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug
Administration Staff; Mobile Medical Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43689 (Jul. 21, 2011) (hereinafter
“MMA Draft Guidance”).
27. This down-classification focused on medical device data systems (MDDS), which
transfer, store, or convert device data, or display device data, without controlling medical devices
themselves. The agency re-classified such devices from Class III to Class I. See FDA, Medical
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approval (PMA) applications be approved by FDA, while low-risk Class I
devices can enter the market through mere 510(k) notifications, unless they are
exempt.) The 2011 MMA Draft Guidance represented a major statement on the
FDA’s interest in digital health. The document was a rather rudimentary primer
on which digital health products might fall under FDA jurisdiction and which
ones might not.28 From the beginning, the agency has declined to exercise
jurisdiction over low-risk digital health products like health trackers or programs
that merely provide generalized medical information. Instead, the MMA Draft
Guidance said the FDA’s risk-based approach would focus on digital health
products that offered “patient-specific analysis and . . . patient-specific diagnosis,
or treatment recommendations.”29 The MMA Draft Guidance received significant
attention from the tech industry,30 which understood the importance of a federal
agency like the FDA announcing its focused attention on digital health, even if
most signals pointed to a quite sympathetic regulator.31 In 2013, FDA finalized
the guidance based on public workshops and other feedback.32
Meanwhile, just as the FDA contemplated how to adapt its relatively old
regulatory framework to relatively novel digital health technologies, Congress
began pushing regulators to consider new frameworks. In 2012, Congress passed
the FDA Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), which called for the FDA, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Office of National
Coordinator for Health IT (ONC) to recommend a “risk-based regulatory
framework” for health IT products, including mobile and digital devices.33 The
resulting report, published in 2014, called for the FDA to maintain its rather
circumscribed approach to health IT products and regulate only a very limited
subset.34 Although the report recommended that the ONC create a new Health IT
Safety Center focused on quality control, the Center would have functioned
mostly to centralize expertise and best practices rather than serve as a traditional
regulator capable of enforcing requirements.35
Devices; Medical Device Data Systems, 76 Fed. Reg. 8637 (Feb. 15, 2011).
28. See MMA Draft Guidance, at supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Brian Dolan, FDA Drafts Mobile Medical App Regulations, MOBIHEALTHNEWS
(Jul. 19, 2011), at https://www.mobihealthnews.com/11970/fda-drafts-mobile-medical-appregulations.
31. Nathan Cortez, The FDA Needs to Regulate “Digital Snake Oil,” SLATE.COM (Sep. 24,
2013), at https://bit.ly/2xQo2EJ.
32. FDA, Mobile Medical Applications; Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug
Administration Staff, 78 Fed. Reg. 59038 (Sep. 25, 2013).
33. Pub. L. No. 112-144 § 618, 112th Cong. 2012, 126 Stat. 993, 1063.
34. FDASIA HEALTH IT REPORT (Apr. 2014), at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM391521.pdf.
35. Id. at 14-16; Nathan G. Cortez, I. Glenn Cohen, & Aaron S. Kesselheim, FDA Regulation
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Furthermore, between 2012 and 2014, Congress considered a series of bills
that sponsors hoped would better guide both the FDA and the digital health
industry.36 Finally, in 2016, at the twilight of the Obama administration,
Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act,37 perhaps most well-known for
relaxing drug approval standards.38 The Cures Act included a section titled
“Clarifying Medical Software Regulation.”39 But rather than modernize the
FDA’s framework for regulating software devices in light of the nascent digital
health revolution, Congress merely tried to clarify FDA jurisdiction over
software. For example, the Cures Act added new section 360j(o) to the federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), clarifying that “devices” subject to FDA
jurisdiction would exclude “health software,” or programs used for
administrative, lifestyle, or patient record purposes.40 Such “health software”
would also include some clinical decision support (CDS) software¾though the
line between CDS subject to FDA jurisdiction and CDS outside it remains
murky, as it has for decades.41
Elsewhere, the Cures Act sent important signals to the FDA. First,
notwithstanding the statutory carve-out for “health software,” the Act gives FDA
discretion to regulate software that it finds to be “reasonably likely to have
serious adverse health consequences.”42 Second, Congress reminded the FDA to
impose the “least burdensome” requirements in reviewing premarket
submissions,43 echoing earlier calls from Congress,44 and even the agency’s own
early statements on software some 30 years earlier.45
Despite these efforts by Congress and the FDA, observers continued to note
of Mobile Health Technologies, 371 N. ENG. J. MED. 372, 377 (2014).
36. Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, supra note 20, at 375-76
(describing proposed legislation).
37. Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3060, 130 Stat. 1033, 1130, 114th Cong. (2016).
38. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, New “21st Century Cures” Legislation: Speed and
Ease vs. Science, 317 JAMA 581 (2017).
39. Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3060.
40. Id. (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)).
41. A long-time critic of the FDA’s unclear position on CDS is Brad Thompson from Epstein
Becker Green, who created the CDS Coalition to focus on drawing the appropriate line between
regulated and non-regulated CDS products. See CDS Coalition, About Us, at
http://cdscoalition.org/about-us/.
42. Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3060(a), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o)(3)(A)(i).
43. Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3058.
44. See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 105115, 105th Cong. § 513 (1997) (calling for the FDA to consider the “least burdensome” ways to
evaluate device effectiveness and substantial equivalence).
45. 1986 Hearing, supra note 1 (promising to impose “the minimum level of regulatory
control necessary” on software). See also Nathan Cortez, Analogy Agency in a Digital World, in
FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 438, 450 (2015).
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the disconnect between an increasingly dated regulatory framework and the
increasingly sophisticated digital health technologies being introduced to the U.S.
market.46 A collective notion began to emerge that digital health required
something new. Indeed, Scott Gottlieb, writing before he became FDA
Commissioner in 2017, critiqued the FDA’s approach to digital health products
in Forbes (“Why Apple Dumbs Down Your Smartphone”) and The Wall Street
Journal (“Why Your Phone Isn’t as Smart as It Could Be”), arguing that fear of,
and uncertainty over, potential FDA regulation stifled innovation.47 The FDA, in
its own words, has repeated the notion that the 1976 device framework “is not
well suited for software-based technologies.”48
Meanwhile, some in the digital health industry grew frustrated with lingering
confusion over the boundaries of FDA jurisdiction. Indeed, the FDA estimated
that it had responded to over 900 inquiries since 2013 about its policies for digital
health.49 Some developers seemed deterred by potential FDA oversight of their
products. Less scrupulous developers tried to avoid FDA oversight with
disclaimers that their products were merely “recreational” or “informational” and
thus did not aim to diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent diseases or other
conditions.50 More serious developers submitted premarket notifications for FDA
review, but grew impatient with what they saw as protracted FDA review cycles,
particularly as compared to relatively short product life cycles.51 Meanwhile,
46. See, e.g., Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 7; Cortez et al., FDA
Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, supra note 20; Nicolas P. Terry, Mobile Health:
Assessing the Barriers, 147 CHEST 1429 (2015); W. Nicholson Price, Black Box Medicine, 28
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 419, 457-62 (2015); Fazal Khan, The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The
Forthcoming Legal Storm over Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession, 26
HEALTH MATRIX 123 (2016); W. Nicholson Price, Regulating Black Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 421 (2017); Rachel E. Sachs, Mobile Health Innovation and Interagency Coordination, 26
ANNALS HEALTH L. 1 (2017); Nathan Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, 14 I/S: A
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 61 (2017); Efthimios Parasidis,
Clinical Decision Support: Elements of a Sensible Legal Framework, 20 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 183 (2018).
47. Scott Gottlieb, Why Apple Dumbs Down Your Smartphone, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2015), at
https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottgottlieb/2015/12/04/why-apple-dumbs-down-your-smartphone/;
Scott Gottlie & Coleen Klasmeier, Why Your Phone Isn’t as Smart as It Could Be, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 7, 2014), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/scott-gottlieb-and-coleen-klasmeier-why-yourphone-isnt-as-smart-as-it-could-be-1407369163.
48. Jeffrey Shuren, Bakul Patel, & Scott Gottlieb, FDA Regulation of Mobile Medical Apps,
JAMA E1 (Jul. 2, 2018); FDA, Developing a Software Precertification Program: A Working Model
v0.1
(Apr.
2018),
at
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/
DigitalHealthPreCertProgram/ucm605685.pdf.
49. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Digital Health Innovation Action Plan at 3 n.4 (June
2017), at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/UCM568735.pdf.
50. See, e.g., Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 7, at 1187-88.
51. Nathan G. Cortez, Nicolas P. Terry, & I. Glenn Cohen, Questions About the FDA’s New
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attorneys and consultants openly advised the industry “How to Avoid FDA
Regulation of Your Mobile Medical App.”52
Moreover, the users of digital health¾patients, physicians, and others¾still
lack reliable guarantees that the products on the market do what they claim. The
sheer volume and variety of digital health products make it daunting for users to
select reliable products from among dozens or perhaps even hundreds of options.
Even physicians, nurses, and others with medical training struggle to evaluate the
flood of digital health products.53 Although the FDA has cleared well over 100
mobile health products through its 510(k) process as of 2016,54 there were
roughly 165,000 health-related programs available for Apple and Android
devices that same year, with 1.7 billion downloads estimated for 2017.55
The void left by lax FDA premarket oversight has been filled to various
degrees. For example, the FTC has brought some high-profile enforcement
actions against digital health products claiming to treat ADHD in pediatric
populations, detect melanomas, measure blood pressure, or improve vision¾all
without sufficient scientific support.56 Alternative methods of screening are being
performed by (i) venture capital firms that are sophisticated in the biosciences,
which may pass on investments without data supporting their claims, (ii)
hospitals creating guidelines for users and developers, which establish ground
rules for selecting reliable products, (iii) third-party app review web sites, many
of which try to review the evidence base supporting a product, and (iv) health
insurers establishing coverage policies, which determine the technologies that
warrant reimbursement.57 I call these “surrogate” or “proxy” forms of regulation
of digital health¾less centralized alternatives that have emerged in the absence
of robust FDA oversight.58 Each has obvious shortcomings. None can replace
meaningful FDA premarket review.
In summary, the legal and regulatory landscape is shifting during what
Framework for Digital Health, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 16, 2017), at
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170816.061554/full/.
52. Keith Barritt, How to Avoid FDA Regulation of Your Mobile Medical App, Med. Device
Online (Jul. 7, 2015).
53. Nathan Cortez, The Evolving Law and Ethics of Digital Health, in DIGITAL HEALTH:
SCALING HEALTHCARE TO THE WORLD 249, 262 (Homero Rivas & Katarzyna Wac, eds. 2018)
54. See, FDA, Examples of Pre-Market Submissions that Include MMAs Cleared or
Approved
by
FDA,
at
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/
MobileMedicalApplications/ucm368784.htm.
55. Research 2 Guidance, Global Mobile Health Market Report 2013-2017 (Mar. 2013), at
https://research2guidance.com/the-market-for-mhealth-app-services-will-reach-26-billion-by2017/.
56. Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, supra note 46, at 74.
57. Nathan Cortez, The Evolving Law and Ethics of Digital Health, in DIGITAL HEALTH:
SCALING HEALTHCARE TO THE WORLD 249 (Homero Rivas & Katarzyna Wac, eds. 2018).
58. Id. at 262.
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seems to be a pivotal moment for digital health. Recent high-profile stumbles by
companies like 23andMe and Theranos should remind us that medical
technologies require more substantiation and evidence base than other products
and services.59 Thus, the lingering challenge remains: What evidence do we
require when digital health products hit the market? And when should such
evidence be due¾before or after market entry? The FDA, responding to calls to
create a more tailored approach, is offering some novel alternatives, which I turn
to next.
II. EVERYTHING’S NEW! THREE EXPERIMENTS IN
MEDICAL PRODUCT REGULATION
In 2017, the FDA announced its Digital Health Innovation Action Plan,60
declaring that the agency was “reimagining its approach to digital health medical
devices”61 and introducing an “entirely new” and “comprehensive approach.”62
The agency itself acknowledged that its new approach was animated by the
disconnect between an aging regulatory framework and increasingly novel
devices: “FDA’s traditional approach to moderate and higher risk hardwarebased medical devices is not well suited for faster iterative design, development,
and type of validation used for software-based medical technologies.”63
The Digital Health Innovation Action Plan introduces three important
experiments in medical product regulation for the FDA. First, the agency is
shifting its focus from pre-market to post-market evidence gathering. Second, the
agency is shifting from product-level reviews to firm-level reviews. And third,
the agency is shifting from governmental to non-governmental decisionmakers as
it introduces the new Software Precertification Program. Each represents a
59. See, e.g., Cortez, Substantiating Big Data in Health Care, supra note 46; JOHN
CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP (2018) (detailing how
Theranos repeatedly attempted to mislead investors, inspectors from the FDA and CMS, and even
its own employees about the capabilities of its blood-testing products); Warning Letter from James
L. Woods, FDA Office of In vitro Diagnostics and Radiological Health to Ann Wojcicki of
23andMe, Inc. of Nov. 22, 2013, available at https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/
WarningLetters/2013/ucm376296.htm (detailing how 23andMe was marketing its direct-toconsumer genetic testing products without FDA approval or clearance as medical devices).
60. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Digital Health Innovation Action Plan (June 2017),
at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/UCM568735.pdf.
61. Id. at 5.
62. Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Fostering Medical Innovation: A Plan
for Digital Health Devices (Jun. 15, 2017), at https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
FDAVoices/ucm612019.htm; Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, FDA Announces
New Steps to Empower Consumers and Advance Digital Healthcare (Jul. 27, 2017), at
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/FDAVoices/ucm612014.htm.
63. Id. at 2.
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significant departure from the FDA’s longstanding approach to regulating
medical products, which for decades has centered on pre-market evaluation of
evidence for a specific product, performed by the agency itself. Thus, the new
framework is a bold departure from the FDA’s historical role as a gatekeeper for
medical products.64 And, arguably, there is not clear statutory authority for these
shifts in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), even as amended by recent
bills like FDASIA and the 21st Century Cures Act.65 Although these experiments
certainly are welcome, they should be evaluated by their ability to generate
reliable evidence of safety and efficacy, and their ability to facilitate high-quality
innovation and deter low-quality innovation in the digital health industry.66
A. Pre-Market to Post-Market
The FDA’s first experiment with digital health is what the agency calls a
“novel” shift from pre-market to post-market oversight.67 FDA will exempt
“lower risk” digital health devices from pre-market review altogether, and then
streamline reviews for “higher risk” digital health products offered by
precertified firms. The FDA also has floated the idea of using “phased” or
“preliminary” market authorization by which it would review some elements
premarket and others post.68 Software products offered by precertified companies
either will receive streamlined FDA review or no review at all, depending on: (i)
the risk presented, from non-serious, to serious, to critical; (ii) the significance of
the information generated to health care decision decisionmaking, from merely
informing clinical management, to driving such management, to outright treating
or diagnosing directly; and (iii) the nature of the introduction, from minor
changes, to major changes, to initial introduction of the product.69 Thus, the FDA
64. See, e.g., DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 544-584 (2010) (describing this dynamic with regard
to pharmaceuticals).
65. Recently, several Senators also made this argument. See Letter from Sen. Elizabeth
Warren, Sen. Patty Murray, & Sen. Tina Smith to Scott Gottlieb, FDA Commissioner, and Jeffrey
Shuren, Director of the FDA Center for Devices and Radiological Health of Oct. 10, 2018 (pp. 34).
66. Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, supra note 20; Price,
Regulating Black Box Medicine, supra note 46, at 455; Parasidis, supra note 46, at 193.
67. Gottlieb, Fostering Medical Innovation, supra note 62.
68. U.S.
Food
and
Drug
Administration,
Challenge
Questions,
at
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/DigitalHealthPreCertProgram/ucm
605686.pdf. As the Senators point out in their letter, supra note 65, “the FDA has stated that
conditional approval¾a regulatory pathway for certain animal drugs that allows these products to
be legally marketed for a period of time . . . while the company continues to collect efficacy
data¾is not appropriate for human medical products, including SaMDs [Software as a Medical
Device].”
69. FDA, Developing a Software Precertification Program, supra note 48, at 10.
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proposes to shift its attention away from premarket evaluation of evidence to
post-market evaluation of evidence, a marked departure for the agency.
Moreover, in line with the 21st Century Cures Act, the FDA will rely on
“post-market collection of real-world data” to review new functions for digital
health products already on the market. This effort will rely on data from the
National Evaluation System for Health Technology (NEST), an FDA-led effort
to collect “real-world evidence” across a product’s entire life cycle and evaluate
it using “advanced analytics.”70 NEST was originally envisioned as a tool for
post-market surveillance, but is being utilized to support the FDA’s “pre- and
postmarket regulatory decisions.”71 For example, the agency envisions that realworld evidence gathered by NEST could be used to support petitions for
reclassification under section 513 of the Act.72 The shift from pre- to post-market
oversight and evidence collection accommodates the short lifecycles and
relatively low risk profiles of many digital health technologies.
Nevertheless, this is an important departure from longstanding FDA
precedent and should be evaluated as an experiment. Will this new framework
generate reliable data? How many products that turn out not to be as safe and
effective as preliminary evidence suggested will be removed from the market?
How much will the new framework change developer incentives to generate
reliable data regarding safety and efficacy? Will post-market data expectations be
enforced? One could imagine a world in which these questions are answered
satisfactorily. But one could just as easily imagine a world in which they aren’t.
What happens then?
B. Product to Firm
Second, the FDA is experimenting with firm-level review in lieu of productlevel review through a new Software Precertification Pilot Program. Companies
that are “pre-certified” will enjoy a quicker pathway to market for their products.
The FDA explains that precertification will “provide more streamlined and
efficient regulatory oversight of software-based medical devices developed by
manufacturers who have demonstrated a robust culture of quality and
70. Id. at 5.
71. FDA, National Evaluation System for Health Technology (NEST), at
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cdrh/cdrhreports/
ucm301912.htm; FDA, Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff: Use of
Real-World Evidence to Support Regulatory Decision-Making for Medical Devices (Aug. 31,
2017),
at
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocume
nts/UCM513027.pdf.
72. FDA, Use of Real-World Evidence, supra note 71, at 10.
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organizational excellence, and who are committed to monitoring real-world
performance of their products once they reach the U.S. market.”73 The goal is to
reward precertified companies by giving their products “a streamlined, lessburdensome” premarket review process or allowing them to bypass it
altogether.74 The pilot will first apply to software as a medical device (SaMD),
then perhaps to software in a medical device (SiMD).75 Precertification will be
granted to companies that satisfy five criteria: patient safety, product quality,
clinical responsibility, cyber security responsibility, and proactive culture.76 In
September 2017, the FDA selected nine companies for the Precertification Pilot:
Apple; Fitbit; Johnson & Johnson; Pear Therapeutics; Phosphorus; Roche;
Samsung; Tidepool; and Verily.77 During the pilot, the agency is soliciting public
comments on its design and performance.78
Streamlined review for the products of precertified companies would depend
on data already submitted to the agency as part of the precertification process, as
well as additional information about “product performance, clinical association
between [product] output and a clinical condition, and safety measures.”79 The
agency and company would then continue to collect “real-world performance
data,” including user experience, software performance information, and clinical
outcomes¾gathered post-market.80
Of course, at the time of this writing, important details remain in flux. An
early model of the precertification program proposed by the FDA would allow
even moderate- or high-risk devices offered by precertified companies to be
eligible for streamlined review.81 The FDA also seems to be contemplating
expanding eligibility for precertification to all companies, not just the ones with
prior experience marketing medical devices in the United States, as suggested
earlier by the agency.82 The details here are important¾how much of a shift from
product- to firm-level scrutiny will occur. And how much of a privileged or
elevated position will precertified firms enjoy? Will precertification status ever
be meaningfully reevaluated or revoked?
73. FDA, Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) Program, at
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/UCM567265.
74. FDA, Fostering Medical Innovation: A Plan for Digital Health Devices; Software
Precertification Pilot Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 35216 (Jul. 28, 2017).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. FDA, Developing Software Precertification Program: A Working Model (v0.2 – June
2018), 13 (June 2018), available at https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/
DigitalHealthPreCertProgram/UCM611103.pdf.
82. Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren et al., supra note 65, at 5.
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On a related front, the FDA also promises a “new approach to the review of
artificial intelligence,” applying pre-certification to AI so that certain certified
companies can make “minor changes to [their] devices without having to make
submissions each time.” Indeed, in April 2019, FDA published its Proposed
Regulatory Framework for Modifications to Artificial Intelligence/Machine
Learning-Based Software as a Medical Device, seeking public feedback.83
Again, a shift from product- to firm-level review is relatively uncharted
territory for the agency. The experiment will test whether firm-level
characteristics such as company culture, in-house expertise, and experience can
better predict product reliability and performance than product-level
characteristics that are typically the focus of FDA reviews. This is a worthwhile
experiment, so long as it is evaluated critically as an experiment.
C. Government to Non-Government
Third, the FDA is experimenting with reviews by independent, nongovernmental certifiers. A longstanding observation is that the FDA historically
has lacked the internal expertise and resources to give in-depth reviews to
sophisticated medical software.84 An early expert on medical device software
observed in 1986 that “even in the best of faith, with the best of will, the best of
technology, the best of intentions,” the FDA could not adequately regulate
software based on the 1976 Device Amendments.85 Although the agency has
made significant advances on this front, it is still overwhelmed by the volume
and variety of digital health technologies.
In this spirit, the FDA has created a new Digital Health Unit,86 as well as a
new program called “Information Exchange and Data Transformation”
(INFORMED), which will conduct regulatory science research to support the
FDA’s new initiatives.87 The program will rely on the “software as a medical
device” (SaMD) framework developed through the FDA’s work with the
83. FDA, Proposed Regulatory Framework for Modifications to Artificial
Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML)-Based Software as a Medical Device (SaMD), Apr. 2,
2019, at https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2019-N-1185-0001&
attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf.
84. See, e.g., Kevin Fu, “Trustworthy Medical Device Software,” Institute of Medicine
Workshop on the FDA’s 510(k) Clearance Process at 35 Years (2011); Cortez, Analog Agency,
supra note 5, at 444-45.
85. 1986 Congressional Hearing, supra note 1 (Statement of Vincent Brannigan).
86. Zachary Brennan, FDA to Create Digital Health Unit, REGULATORY FOCUS (May 4,
2017), at https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus/news-articles/2017/5/fda-to-create-digital-healthunit.
87. FDA,
Information
Exchange
and
Data
Transformation
(INFORMED),
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/oce/ucm543768.h
tm
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International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF), an international
consortium of device regulators. Thus, even as the FDA continues to build its
internal capacities on digital health, it will nevertheless experiment with
outsourcing to third-party certifiers. As a result, new digital health devices could
be introduced to market “without FDA ever reviewing either the medical device
software developed by a company or the company itself.”88
The use of non-FDA certifiers is a genuine innovation at the agency
(although, to be fair, the FDA relies on advisory panels and the like for new drug
reviews). But it is not an innovation outside the agency. Numerous other federal
programs rely on third-party certifications or appraisals. A well-known example
in the health industry is hospital accreditation by the Joint Commission. The
Medicare statute provides that any hospital accredited by the Joint Commission is
“deemed” to comply with Medicare’s extensive “conditions of participation.”89
In early documents, the FDA describes its third-party precertification process as
involving four steps: (i) an initial application; (ii) an appraisal by the third-party
certifier; (iii) a determination by the FDA; and (iv) maintenance of the
certification through “automated and manual analysis” of continued compliance
with the standards.90 This process roughly follows the application-appraisaldetermination process used by the Joint Commission. The FDA explains that
maintaining precertification status will involve automated review of “objective
evidence” made available to the FDA.91 Automated review itself raises a host of
questions, although again these features remain in flux during the pilot program.
IV. EVALUATING THE EXPERIMENT
The FDA’s experiments with digital health are really experiments in medical
product regulation, itself a form of risk regulation. Drugs, devices, and biologics
do not enter the U.S. market without a determination¾direct or indirect¾that
their benefits outweigh their risks. For decades, the lodestar of medical product
regulation has been premarket review, with the FDA serving as an expert
gatekeeper evaluating clinical data to determine whether products are safe and
effective for their intended uses.92 Even for medical devices, 99% of which are
cleared through the 510(k) notification process rather than being approved
through the premarket approval (PMA) process,93 the FDA plays a gatekeeping
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren et al., supra note 65, at 5.
42 C.F.R. § 482.22 (2018).
FDA, Developing a Software Precertification Program, supra note 48, at 6.
Id. at 7.
See generally CARPENTER, supra note 64.
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K)
CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS (Jul. 29, 2011), http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/Reports/
2011/Medical-Devices-and-the-Publics-Health-The-FDA-510k-Clearance-Process-at-35-
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role: determinations of “substantial equivalence” that are key to the 510(k)
process often depend on subsidiary questions that touch on the product’s
underlying ratio of benefits to risks.
Now, this gatekeeping function has been relaxed for digital health products.
This part thus identifies a series of important questions we should consider as
these experiments move forward.
A. Evidence and Incentives?
A core feature of FDA regulation of medical products is its gatekeeping
authority over market entry.94 The government’s leverage in this scheme
encourages companies to produce more and better information about their
products than they otherwise would absent FDA premarket review. Thus, when
evaluating the FDA’s new approach to digital health, we should consider the
extent to which it alters manufacturer incentives to generate reliable data
regarding the safety and efficacy of their products. How will the new system
compare to the existing 510(k) system (which itself has been criticized for
generating insufficient data)? When should such data be generated¾before
market introduction or after? And what types of data should we expect?
Now might be the time to consider appropriate standards for demonstrating
efficacy in digital health products, particularly those that rely on predictive
analytics. For example, the FDA should encourage developers to identify
clinically-relevant endpoints that can help demonstrate a product’s clinical
benefit.95 Although measurements like overall survival might prove difficult for
digital health products, other surrogate endpoints might correspond to meaningful
clinical benefits, provided they are subject to rigorous validation.96 Moreover, the
FDA should consider current clinical practices as a valid benchmark¾is the
digital health product inferior when compared to clinician performance?97 We
should not necessarily expect digital health products to be perfect, or even
obviously superior to clinicians, but at the very least they should not be inferior.98
Years.aspx.
94. See, e.g., CARPENTER, supra note 64, at 544-84 (discussing how this gatekeeping
authority over drugs, for example, has extended FDA’s influence over medical research itself).
95. See, e.g., Ravi B. Parikh, Ziad Obermeyer, & Amol S. Navathe, Regulation of Predictive
Analytics in Medicine, 363 SCIENCE 810 (2019).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. For example, the FDA recently cleared a convolutional neural network that is able to
predict stroke more rapidly than neuroradiologists. See FDA, Office of the Commissioner, Press
Announcements: FDA Permits Marketing of Clinical Decision Support Software for Alerting
Providers of a Potential Stroke in Patients (Feb. 13, 2018), at https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/
newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm596575.htm.
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Given the proposed shift from pre-market to post-market review, the users
and payers that rely on digital health products introduced under the new system
may still lack reliable evidence that the products work as intended. Of course,
compared to the current system in which very few digital health products either
seek or obtain 510(k) clearance, that is undoubtedly already the case.
Nevertheless, the concern is that over the long term, the lack of reliable evidence
may depress demand and thus adoption of digital health products.99 The fact that
Apple and other well-known companies introduce products may spur adoption.
But what of less familiar firms?
Consumer trust¾or the lack thereof¾is an important question for the digital
health industry.100 Users can easily be overwhelmed by the sheer volume and
variety of digital health tools on the market, and even licensed practitioners will
find it daunting to evaluate the benefits and risks of dozens (if not hundreds) of
options. Thus, the FDA posits that its new “efficient regulation” of digital health
products, particularly its precertification program, “can increase consumer
confidence” in these technologies and “help patients, payers, and investors better
understand” the products, thereby inducing a “race to the top” among
developers.101 In an early document describing the agency’s precertification
program, FDA says the program “is intended to drive market competition to
higher standards of safety and effectiveness.”102 But it is not at all clear why the
FDA’s precertification program will encourage a “race to the top.” It may
encourage a race to precertify, for sure. But can we call precertification “the
top”?
It depends. One method that might pair well with the new post-market
approach is a mandatory reevaluation period at some specified interval¾such as
two or three years¾as some foreign jurisdictions have contemplated.103
Mandatory post-market reviews would preserve incentives to generate data
regarding product performance. Weak incentives may undermine the delicate
balance between pre- and post-market oversight that the new digital health
approach aspires to achieve. The new precertification process is based on the idea
that the FDA should trust certain manufacturers but verify performance,104
99. Daniel Carpenter, Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?, in
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 164, 164-90 (Edward J.
Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010).
100. Cortez, The FDA Should Regulate Digital Snake Oil, supra note 31.
101. Jeffrey Shuren, Bakul Patel, & Scott Gottlieb, FDA Regulation of Mobile Medical Apps,
JAMA (Jul. 2, 2018).
102. FDA, Developing a Software Precertification Program, supra note 48, at 2.
103. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kramer et al., Ensuring Medical Device Effectiveness and Safety: A
Cross-National Comparison of Approaches to Regulation, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1 (2014).
104. FDA, Developing a Software Precertification Program: A Working Model v0.1 (Apr.
2018), at 2.
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recalling President Reagan’s “trust-but-verify” approach to Soviet nuclear
disarmament.105 But how rigorous will the “verify” step be? And if the
verification process reveals shortcomings, what then? There should be real
consequences, including de-certification and market withdrawals.
B. New Governance: Theory vs. Reality?
Long ago regulatory theorists became enamored with “new governance,” a
set of alternative regulatory approaches that reject traditional command-andcontrol regulation, particularly its reliance on formal sanctions, in favor of more
cooperative, decentralized, “soft law” approaches.106 Advantages are supposed to
include greater flexibility, transparency, responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, and
even higher levels of compliance.107 The FDA’s digital health experiments all
sound in new governance.
But it remains to be seen whether and how the FDA may use traditional
enforcement tools to buttress its more friendly, flexible approach to digital
health. The voluminous literature on “new governance” once promised that more
cooperative, flexible regulation would achieve better outcomes than more
traditional, centralized regulation and enforcement.108 But some of the gloss has
worn off. Indeed, after the recent Boeing recall of its 737 Max aircraft, critics
highlighted how the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had allowed Boeing
to self-test and self-certify its new plane design and flight software.109
Thus, the experiment with third-party precertification must win over skeptics
that question its effectiveness. To cite a relevant example closer to home, the
federal Office of National Coordinator for Health Information Technology
(ONC) used a similar third-party certification process for determining whether
electronic health records (EHR) met federal “meaningful use” requirements, but
it produced underwhelming results.110 Similarly, an early effort by a third-party
certifier called “Happtique,” designed to certify that mobile health applications
105. Barton Swaim, An Untrustworthy Political Dictum, WASH. POST. (Mar. 13, 2016).
106. I summarize some of this literature in Nathan Cortez, Embracing the New Geography of
Health Care: A Novel Way to Cover Those Left Out of Health Reform, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 859, 90206 (2011) (citing articles).
107. Id. at 902.
108. Id.
109. Brian Naylor, Boeing’s Not Alone in Companies That Government Agencies Have Let
Self-Regulate, NPR, All Things Considered (Apr. 2, 2019), available at https://www.npr.org/2019/
04/02/709203191/boeings-not-alone-in-companies-that-government-agencies-have-let-selfregulate.
110. Erin McCann, Many ONC-Certified EHRs Actually Fail to Meet Certification Standards,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sep. 9, 2015), at https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/onc-certifiedehrs-might-not-actually-be-certified.
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met certain privacy standards, was suspended after a researcher found blatant
security lapses among programs that had been certified.111 And, of course, in the
broader health care sphere, third-party accreditors like the Joint Commission,
which is responsible for accrediting hospitals for the Medicare program, have
been criticized for rarely denying applications for accreditation and virtually
never revoking them.112
This is not to say that third-party certification is necessarily doomed. Rather,
the point is that it succeeds only with meaningful monitoring and enforcement.
So-called “soft law” approaches, ironically, may only work well if reinforced
with more traditional “hard law” backstops.
C. Clinical Decision Support?
Another important question that remains unanswered after decades of
congressional acts and FDA guidance documents is how the FDA will treat
clinical decision support (CDS) software. On one hand, the Cures Act exempts
from FDA regulation “health software,” including most CDS programs. On the
other hand, it authorizes FDA to regulate health software if the agency finds that
it “would reasonably be likely to have serious adverse health consequences.”113
In making this finding, Congress directs the FDA to consider four factors: (i) the
likelihood and severity of patient harm; (ii) the extent to which the software is
intended to support the clinical judgment of a health professional; (iii) whether
the health professional has a “reasonable opportunity . . . to review the basis” of
the recommendation; and (iv) the intended user and environment.114
In a 2017 guidance, FDA explained that it will evaluate the third
factor¾whether health professionals have a “reasonable opportunity to review
the basis” of software recommendations¾based on how clearly the software
111. Brian Dolan, Happtique Suspends Mobile Health App Certification Program,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Dec. 13, 2013), at https://www.mobihealthnews.com/28165/happtiquesuspends-mobile-health-app-certification-program.
112. Timothy S. Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations: A Healthy Relationship?, 57 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBS. 15, 39-40 (1994).
113. Cures Act, section 3060(a), codified at 21 U.S.C. 360j(o)(3)(A).
114. Id. The FDA also addresses “patient decision support” (PDS) software, which is designed
for use by patients or caregivers who are not health care professionals. FDA guidelines exempt
PDS software if it meets three criteria: (1) it is not intended to acquire, process, or analyze a
medical image or signal from an in vitro diagnostic device or a pattern or signal from a signal
acquisition system, (2) it is intended for the purpose of displaying , analyzing, or printing medical
information about a patient or other medical information, such as information derived from peerreviewed clinical studies or practice guidelines, and (3) it is intended for the purpose of supporting
or making recommendations to a patient, in terms that are understandable to the patient, about
preventing, diagnosing, or treating diseases or other conditions. See FDA, Draft Guidance: Clinical
and Patient Decision Support Software (Dec. 8, 2017), at 6, available at https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM587819.pdf.
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explains: (i) the purpose or intended use of the software; (ii) the intended user
(e.g., ultrasound technicians, vascular surgeons); (iii) the inputs used to generate
the recommendation; and (iv) the rationale or support for the recommendation.115
Thus, decision support software will not be regulated as medical devices if they
intended user is “able to reach the same recommendation on his or her own
without relying primarily on the software . . . “116 The sources and inputs
informing the recommendation, then, must be public and understandable to the
intended user.117
These criteria resurrect a notion from the FDA’s 1987 Draft Software
Guidance regarding “competent human intervention.”118 The 1987 guidance
explained that FDA would exempt from regulation any artificial intelligence or
decision support software that allowed ample time for “competent human
intervention,” meaning time during which “clinical judgment and experience can
be used to check and interpret a system’s output” before “any impact on human
health.”119 Thus, the FDA asserted jurisdiction over decision support software
that is opaque and used in circumstances where there is little opportunity for
independently evaluating options. So software directing a nurse to “Inject Dose
Now!” would be subject to regulation, while software recommending injections
at specific intervals well in advance, with the opportunity for nurses to consider
the appropriateness of those intervals, would not be subject to regulation.120
Thus, the idea of drawing lines between decisionmaking that is primarily
driven by automation and driven by professional judgment is an old one. But
studies of human-computer interaction (HCI) show that we are dangerously
predisposed to trust automated advice, even if we have the opportunity and
reasons to question it.121 So-called “automation bias” leads us to believe that
automated advice is resistant to errors or infallible, even when presented with
reasons to believe otherwise.122 Indeed, automation bias remains a problem in
aviation safety, a lesson we should heed in medicine.123 Thus, in practice users
are likely to trust automated advice without question, even if there is time for
competent human intervention. Humans are busy and fallible, and we are likely
to outsource decisionmaking to automation if the option is available.
115. FDA, Draft Guidance: Clinical and Patient Decision Support Software, supra note 114, at
8.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer Products, 52 Fed. Reg. 36,104.
119. Id.
120. See Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, supra note 7, at 1220.
121. Id. at 1227-28.
122. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1271-72.
123. See, e.g., Linda J. Skitka et al., Automation Bias and Errors: Are Crews Better than
Individuals?, 10 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL. 85, 86 (2000).

24

DIGITAL HEALTH AND REGULATORY EXPERIMENTATION AT THE FDA

These considerations deserve much more attention than they have received
in the 21st Century Cures Act or in the FDA’s many guidances to date. The FDA
has taken a thoughtful approach, to be sure. And drawing the line between CDS
that should and should not be regulated is a difficult task, to be sure. But
important questions remain.
D. Statutory Authority?
Finally, the FDA’s bold experiments with digital health do not find clear
support in the statute, even after the 21st Century Cures Act. For example, an
earlier version of the Cures Act authorized the FDA to craft a new regulatory
framework, but the final bill omitted the provision.124 The Cures Act that passed
included more modest provisions defining “health software” as falling outside the
definition of medical “devices.”125 In fact, Commissioner Gottlieb’s
announcement itself acknowledged that the FDA might not have clear statutory
authority to introduce the third-party precertification program.126 And an October
2018 letter from three senators to the FDA questioned the FDA’s statutory
authority for creating a precertification program, for using “phased” or
“conditional” approvals, and for using third-party reviews.127
On the other hand, Congress repeatedly directs the FDA to use the least
burdensome approach to reviewing medical devices,128 and these experiments
would seem to be in precisely that spirit. Of course, a “least burdensome”
approach would have to be within statutory bounds¾which is questionable at
best. In the end, if the FDA’s experiments show some success, it is not
inconceivable that the agency could convince Congress to codify its practices by
statute¾something the agency has a track record of achieving.129 In that case,
resolving the foregoing issues will go a long way toward convincing skeptics that
these experiments with medical product regulation are superior to the FDA’s
longstanding (but decidedly less exciting) approach.
V. MOVING FORWARD
Instead of a traditional conclusion, let me offer some thoughts on how to
124. See, e.g., 21st Century Cures Act, H.R. 6, 114th Cong. (2015-16), at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/6/text.
125. Id. at § 618.
126. Gottlieb, Fostering Medical Innovation, supra note 62.
127. Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren et al., supra note 65, at 3-5.
128. See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA), Pub. L.
No. 112-144, § 602 (2012); Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act § 205(a)-(b), Pub. L.
No. 105-115 (1997).
129. See, e.g., Richard A. Merrill, Modernizing the FDA: An Incremental Revolution, 18
HEALTH AFF. 96 (1999).
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move forward. The FDA’s new plans for digital health should be viewed as
experiments with medical product regulation, and should be evaluated as such.
What data and substantiation should we require of digital health products before
they hit the market, and how do we best preserve developer incentives to
generate reliable data regarding safety and efficacy after products are on the
market? Will third-party certifiers provide meaningful review? Will firm-level
characteristics be a better proxy than product-level characteristics in predicting
how useful and reliable digital health products are? If shortcomings become
apparent, how will the new framework adapt? And will the FDA use hard law
backstops such as de-certification, product withdrawals, and traditional
regulatory enforcement (such as adulteration and misbranding actions) when,
inevitably, problems do occur? Finally, how does the new framework compare
with the old?
The tone of this article might suggest that these experiments are not
worthwhile¾which could not be further from the truth. The FDA’s medical
device framework has yellowed with time, and the FDA is taking bold moves to
adapt its old framework to very new products in the absence of genuine
congressional intervention. But hopefully these bold experiments will not calcify
into a weak default approach that lingers for decades, as the FDA’s 1987 and
1989 draft guidances on software did.130 There are lessons to be learned from that
tentative approach,131 if we chose to heed them. Now is the time to evaluate the
FDA’s experiments as experiments.

130. For an evaluation of this problem, see Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation,
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